English]. Critical models :interventions and catchwords I Theodor W. Adorno; translated and with a preface by Henry W. Pickford. p. em.- (European perspectives).

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EuRoPEAN PERSPECTIVES A Series in Social Thought and Cultural Criticism Lawrence D. Kritzman, Editor European Perspectives presents English translations of books by leading European thinkers. With both classic and outstanding contemporary works, the series aims to shape the major intellectual controversies of our day and to facilitate the tasks of torical understanding. Julia Kristeva Theodor W. Adorno Richard Wolin, editor Antonio Gramsci Jacques LeGoff Alain Finkielkraut Julia Krist eva Pierre Bourdieu Pierre Vidal-Naquet Hugo Ball Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Karl Heinz Bohrer Alain Finkielkraut Julia Krist eva Elisabeth Badinter Karl Lowith Gilles Deleuze Pierre Vidal-Naquet Norbert Elias Louis Althusser Elisabeth Roudinesco Ross Guberman Kelly Oliver Pierra Nora Claudine Fabre-Vassas Strangers to Ourselves Notes to Literature, vols.1 and 2 The Heidegger Controversy Prison Notebooks, vols. 1 and 2 History and Memory Remembering in Vain: The Klaus Barbie Trial and Crimes Against Humanity Nations Without Nationalism The Field of Cultural Production Assassins of Memory: Essays on the Denial of the Holocaust Critique of the German Intelligentsia What Is Philosophy? Suddenness: On the Moment of Aesthetic Appearance The Defeat of the Mind New Maladies of the Soul XY: On Masculine Identity Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism Negotiations, 1972-1990 The jews: History, Memory, and the Present The Germans Writings on Psychoanalysis: Freud and Lacan jacques Lacan: His Life and Work julia Kristeva Interviews The Portable Kristeva Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past, vol. 1: Conflicts and Divisions, vol. 2: Traditions, vol. 3: Symbols The Singular Beast: jews, Christians, and the Pig Critical Models Interventions and Catchwords Theodor W. Adorno Translated and with a Preface by Henry W Pickford Columbia University Press New York

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Ł The Press gratefully acknowledges a grant from Inter Nationes toward costs of translating this work. Columbia University Press Publishers Since 1893 New York Chichester, West Sussex Eingriffe: Neun kritische Madelle copyright© 1963 by Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main Stichworte: Kritische Madelle 2 copyright© 1969 by Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main Translation copyright© 1998 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Adorno, Theodor W., 1903-1969. @l [Eingriffe. English] Critical models :interventions and catchwords I Theodor W. Adorno; translated and with a preface by Henry W. Pickford. p. em.-(European perspectives) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-231-07634-7 1. Social history-20th century. 2. Social sciences-Philosophy. I. Adorno, Theodor W., 1903-1969. Stichworte. English. II. Title. III. Series. HN16.A3313 1998 301′.01-dc21 97-39500 Case bound editions of Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper. Printed in the United States of America c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Contents Preface vii Interventions Nine Critical Models 1 Introduction 3 Why Still Philosophy 5 Philosophy and Teachers 19 Note on Human Science and Culture 37 Those Twenties 41 Prologue to Television 49 Television as Ideology 59 Sexual Taboos and Law Today 71 The Meaning of Working Through the Past 89 Opinion Delusion Society 105 Catchwords Critical Models 2 123 Introduction 125 Notes on Philosophical Thinking 127 Reason and Revelation 135 Progress 143

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Critique Something should be said about critique in its connection with politics. Since, however, politics is not a self-enclosed, isolated sphere, as it manifests itself for instance in political institutions, processes, and procedural rules, but rather can be conceived only in its relationship to the societal play of forces making up the substance of everything political and veiled by political surface phenomena, so too the concept of critique cannot be restricted to a narrow political field. Critique is essential to all democracy. Not only does democracy require the freedom to criticize and need critical impulses. Democracy is nothing less than defined by critique. This can be recalled simply in the historical fact that the conception of the separation of powers, upon which every democracy is based, from Locke and Montesquieu and the American constitution up to today, has its lifeblood in critique. The tem of checks and balances””, the reciprocal overview of the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary, means as much as that each of these powers subjects the others to critique and thereby reduces the despotism that each power, without this critical element, gravitates to. Critique and the prerequisite of democracy, political maturity, belong together. Politically mature is the person who speaks for himself, because he has thought for himself and is not merely repeating someone else; he stands free of any guardian.1 This is demonstrated in the power to resist established ions and, one and the same, also to resist existing institutions, to resist

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282 CRITICAL MODELS 3 everything that is merely posited, that justifies itself with its existence. Such resistance, as the ability to distinguish between what is known and what is accepted merely by convention or under the constraint of ity, is one with critique, whose concept indeed comes from the Greek krino, “to decide.” He who equates the modern concept of reason with critique is scarcely exaggerating. The Enlightenment thinker Kant, who wanted to see society emancipated from its self-incurred immaturity and who taught autonomy,2 that is, judgment according to one’s own insight in contrast to heteronomy, obedience to what is urged by others, named his three major works critiques. This was true not only for the tual capacities, whose limits he intended to measure off and whose dures to construe. The power of Kant, as for instance Kleist vividly sensed, was that of critique in a very concrete sense.3 He criticized the dogmatism of the rationalistic systems that were accepted prior to him: the Critique of Pure Reason was more than anything else a blistering tique of Leibniz and Wolf. The influence of Kant’s main work was due to its negative results, and one of its most important parts, which dealt with pure thought’s transgressions of its own limits, was thoroughly negative. But critique, cornerstone of reason and bourgeois thinking tout court, by no means dominated spirit as much as one would assume from that spirit’s self-image. Even the all-destroyer, as Kant was called two dred years ago, often showed the gestures of one who blamed critique for being improper. His vocabulary shows this in malicious expressions like “subtle reasoning” [Verniinfteln ], which not only punish reason’s exceeding its bounds but also want to bridle its use that, in Kant’s own understanding, irresistibly surges past its own limits. Finally Hegel, in whom the movement commencing with Kant culminates, and who in many passages equates thinking altogether with negativity and hence with critique, likewise has the opposite tendency: to bring critique to a halt. Whoever relies on the limited activity of one’s own understanding Hegel calls, using a political epithet, Raisonneur [carper, argufier] and accuses of vanity because he does not reflect on his own finitude, is pable of subordinating himself to something higher, the totality.4 ever, for Hegel this higher thing is the present conditions. Hegel’s sion to critique goes together with his thesis that the real is rationai.S According to Hegel’s authoritarian directive, that person is truly in trol of his reason who does not insist on reason’s antithesis to what presently exists, but rather within given reality recognizes his own son. The individual citizen is supposed to capitulate before reality. The renunciation of critique is twisted into a higher wisdom; the young Marx’s phrase about the ruthless critique of everything existing was the Critique 28) simple reply to this, and even the mature Marx subtitled his main work a “critique.”6 The substantive import of those passages in Hegel, especially in the book that concentrates his anti-critical tendency, the Philosophy of Right, is societal.? One need not be a sociologist to hear in his ridicule of the Raisonneur and the starry-eyed reformer the unctuous sermon admonishing the underling to keep still, who out of stupidity-the ification of which obviously does not concern his guardian-objects to the decrees descending upon him from the authorities on high, because said underling is incapable of recognizing that ultimately everything is and happens for the best and that those who are above his station in life also should be his intellectual superiors. Something of the contradiction between the modern emancipation of critical spirit and its simultaneous dampening is characteristic of the entire bourgeois period: from an early period onward the bourgeoisie must have feared that the logic of its own principles could lead beyond its own sphere of interests. Habermas has demonstrated contradictions of this sort in the notion of the public sphere-the most important medium of all politically effective cism-that on the one hand should concentrate the critical political maturity of society’s subjects and, on the other, has become a commodity and works against the critical principle in order to better market itself.B It is easily forgotten in Germany that critique, as a central motif of spirit, is not very popular anywhere in the world. But there is reason to reflect on a specifically German phenomenon in the hostility to critique especially in the political arena. Full-fledged bourgeois emancipation was not successful in Germany, or only in a historical period in which its requisite, the liberalism of diffused free enterprise, already mined. Likewise the unification into a nation-state-which in many other countries was attained parallel to the strengthening of the geoisie-limped behind history and became a short intermezzo. This may have caused the German trauma of unity and unanimity that scents weakness in that multiplicity whose resultant outcome is democratic will formation. Whoever criticizes violates the taboo of unity, which tends toward totalitarian organization. The critic becomes a divisive influence and, with a totalitarian phrase, a subversive. The denunciation of alleged quarrels in the party was an indispensable propaganda tool for the National Socialists. The unity-trauma has survived Hitler and has bly even been intensified by the division of Germany following the war Hitler unleashed. It is a banality that democracy was a belated arrival in Germany. There is probably less general awareness, however, that the consequences of this belatedness extended even into the ramifications of

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284 CRITICAL MODELS 3 mind. Besides the economic and straightforward societal problems democracy in Germany confronts in order to permeate the sovereign people [Volk], not inconsiderable is the additional difficulty that mocratic and undemocratic forms of consciousness-in particular those that stem from statism and a thinking that conforms to vive in the midst of a suddenly implanted democracy and prevent people from making it their own. One such vestigial pattern of behavior is the mistrust of critique and the inclination to throttle it under some pretense or other. The fact that Goebbels could degrade the concept of critic into that of criticaster, could maliciously associate it with the concept of the grumbler, and wanted to prohibit the criticism of all art was not only meant to take independent intellectual impulses in hand. The dist was calculating in terms of social psychology. He could tap into the general German prejudice against critique that dates back to absolutism. He was expressing the heartfelt convictions of those already being led by the hand. If one wanted to sketch an anatomy of the German hostility to tique, one would find it unquestionably bound up with the rancor against the intellectual. In public or, in Franz Bohm’s expression, non-public opinion, the suspect intellectual is probably equated with the person who criticizes.9 It seems plausible that anti-intellectualism derives originally from a submissiveness to officialdom. Again and again the injunction is intoned that critique must be responsible. But that always amounts to meaning that only those are actually justified to criticize who happen to be in a responsible position, just as even anti-intellectualism until quite recently didn’t extend to state-employed intellectuals like professors.10 According to the subject matter of their work, professors would have to be counted among the intellectuals. However, in general, because of their prestige as government officials, they were highly respected in lished public opinion as long as conflicts with students didn’t convince them of their actual powerlessness. Critique is being departmentalized, as it were. It is being transformed from the human right and human duty of every citizen into a privilege of those who are qualified by virtue of the recognized and protected positions they occupy. Whoever practices tique without having the power to carry through his opinion, and out integrating himself into the official hierarchy, should keep that is the form in which the variation of the cliche about servants’ ited powers of understanding returns in the Germany that formally has equal rights. Obviously, people who are institutionally intertwined with present conditions will in general hesitate to criticize them. Even more than administrative-legal conflicts they fear conflicts with the opinions of their own group. By means of the division between responsible cri-Critique 285 tique, namely, that practiced by those who bear public responsibility, and irresponsible critique, namely, that practiced by those who cannot be held accountable for the consequences, critique is already neutralized. The unspoken abrogation of the right to critique for those who have no tion makes the privilege of education, especially the career insulated by official examinations, into the authority defining who may criticize, whereas the truth content of critique alone should be that authority. All this is unspoken and not institutionally anchored but so deeply present in the preconscious of innumerable people that it exercises a kind of social control. In recent years there has been no lack of cases where ple outside of the hierarchy-which, incidentally, in the age of celebrities is certainly not limited to officials-practiced critique, for instance, cizing the juridical practices in a certain city. They were immediately rebuffed as grumblers. It is not enough to answer this by indicating the mechanisms that in Germany create the suspicion that the independent individualist or dissenting person is a fool. The state of affairs is much more grave: through the anti-critical structure of public opinion the senter as a type is really brought into the situation of the grumbler and takes on the characteristics of a malcontent, to the extent that those acteristics have not already driven him to stubborn critique. Unwavering critical freedom easily slides by its own dynamic into the attitude of Michael Kohlhaas, who not coincidentally was a German.11 One of the most important conditions for changing the structure of public opinion in Germany would be if the facts I’ve indicated here became generally conscious, for instance, were treated in civics education, and thereby would lose some of their disastrously blind power. Occasionally the tionship of German public opinion to critique virtually seems to be stood on its head. The right to free critique is unilaterally invoked for the good of those who oppose the critical spirit of a democratic society. However, the vigilance that rebels against such misuse requires the strength of public opinion that is still lacking in Germany and that can hardly be duced by mere appeal. Indicative of the concealed relationship of public opinion to critique is the attitude of its organs that actually lay claim to a tradition of freedom. Many newspapers that by no means wish to be thought reactionary assiduously cultivate a tone that in America, where analogies are not lacking, one calls pontifical*. They speak as though they stood above the controversies, assume a posture of sage experience that would befit the epithet “old-maidish.” Their supercilious remove usually only benefits the defense of the official state of affairs. At most the powers are solemnly encouraged not to let themselves be swayed from their good intentions. The language of such newspapers sounds like that of govern-

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286 CRITICAL MODELS ) mental announcements, even where nothing is being announced about any government. Behind the pontifical posture stands the authoritarian one: both in those who assume it and in the consumers who are being cleverly targeted. Identification with power prevails in Germany now just as it did before; in this lurks the dangerous potential of identifying oneself with power politics inwardly and outwardly. The caution cised in reforming institutions, where the reform is demanded by critical consciousness and to a considerable degree is acknowledged by the utive powers, is based on the fear of the voting masses; this fear easily renders critique without consequence. It also indicates how widespread the anti-critical spirit is in those whose interest should lie in critique. Critique’s lack of consequence in Germany has a specific model, sumably of military origin: the tendency to protect at any cost nates who are charged with misbehavior or offense. In military chies the oppressive element of such an esprit de corps may be found everywhere; however, if I am not mistaken, then it is specifically German that this military behavior pattern also thoroughly dominates the civil, especially the specifically political spheres. One cannot shake the feeling that in answer to every public critique the higher authorities, who stand above the person being criticized and who ultimately bear the bility, first and foremost, irrespective of the facts of the case, defend the criticized person and strike outward. This mechanism, which sociology really should study thoroughly, is so ingrained that it automatically threatens political criticism with a fate similar to that granted the soldier who dared to complain about his superior during the Wilhelminian era. The rancor toward the institution of defense commissioner is symbolic for this entire sphere. Perhaps the damaged German relationship to critique is most hensible in its lack of consequence. If Germany deserves the title “land of unlimited presumabilities” that Ulrich Sonnemann formulated, then this too is related.121t may be simply a phrase that someone has been swept away by the pressure of public opinion; however, worse than the phrase is when no public opinion forms to exert that kind of pressure, or, when no consequences are drawn if it does happen. A topic for political science would be research studies comparing the consequences of public opinion, unofficial critique in the old democracies of England, France, America with the consequences in Germany. I do not dare to anticipate the result of such a study, but I can imagine it. If the Spiegel affair is held out as the one exception, then it should be kept in mind that in that case the protesting newspapers, bearers of public opinion, showed their rare verve not out of any solidarity with the freedom to criticize and its site, unimpeded information, but rather because they saw themselves Critique 287 threatened in their own concrete interests, news value*, the market value of information.B I am not underestimating attempts at effective public critique in Germany. They include the fall of a radical right-wing ter of culture in one federal state. However, since that solidarity between students and professors does not exist anywhere now the way it did then in Gottingen, it is doubtful whether something similar could happen again today.14 It looks to me as though the spirit of public critique, after it was monopolized by political groups and thereby became publicly promised, has suffered severe setbacks; I hope I am mistaken. Essentially German, although once again not so completely as one who has not had the opportunity to observe similar phenomena in other countries might easily suppose, is an anti-critical schema from phy-precisely the philosophy that besmirched the Raisonneur-that has sunk into blather: the appeal to the positive. One continually finds the word critique, if it is tolerated at all, accompanied by the word structive. The insinuation is that only someone can practice critique who can propose something better than what is being criticized; Lessing derided this two hundred years ago in aesthetics.15 By making the tive a condition for it, critique is tamed from the very beginning and loses its vehemence. In Gottfried Keller there is a passage where he calls the demand for something edifying a “gingerbread word.” He roughly argues that much would already be gained if the mustiness were cleared away where something that has gone bad blocks the light and fresh air.l6 In fact, it is by no means always possible to add to critique the immediate practical recommendation of something better, although in many cases critique can proceed by way of confronting realities with the norms to which those realities appeal: following the norms would already be ter. The word positive, which not only Karl Kraus decades ago but also a hardly radical writer like Erich Kiistner polemicized against, has in the meantime in Germany been made into a magic charmY It automatically snaps into place. Its dubiousness can be seen in the fact that in the present situation the higher form, toward which society should move according to progressive thought, can no longer be read out of reality as a concrete tendency. If one wanted for that reason to renounce the critique of ety, then one would only reinforce society in precisely the dubiousness that obstructs its transition to a higher form. The objective obstruction of what is better does not abstractly affect the larger whole. In every vidual phenomenon one criticizes, one swiftly runs up against that tation. Again and again the demand for positive proposals proves fillable, and for that reason critique is all the more comfortably defamed. Perhaps the observation suffices here that from a social-psychological perspective the craving for the positive is a screen-image of the destruc-

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290 CRITICAL MODELS J the aversion were not legitimate and only distorted by privilege. The trust of whoever distrusts praxis extends from those on the opposite side who repeat the old slogan “enough talking already” all the way to the objective spirit of advertising that propagates the image-they call it a “guiding image” -of the active, practical person, be he an industrial leader or an athlete. One should join in. Whoever only thinks, removes himself, is considered weak, cowardly, virtually a traitor. The hostile cliche of the intellectual works its way deeply into that oppositional group, without them having noticed it, and who in turn are slandered as “intellectuals.” Thinking actionists answer: among the things to be changed include precisely the present conditions of the separation of theory and praxis. Praxis is needed, they say, precisely in order to do away with the tion by practical people and the practical ideal. But then this is quickly transformed into a prohibition on thinking. A minimum is sufficient to turn the resistance to repression repressively against those who, as little as they wish to glorify their individual being, nonetheless do not renounce what they have become. The much invoked unity of theory and praxis has the tendency of slipping into the predominance of praxis. Many movements defame theory itself as a form of oppression, as though praxis were not much more directly related to oppression. In Marx the doctrine of this unity was inspired by the real possibility of action, which even at that time was not actualized.1 Today what is ing is more the direct contrary. One clings to action for the sake of the impossibility of action. Admittedly, already in Marx there lies concealed a wound. He may have presented the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach so authoritatively because he knew he wasn’t entirely sure about it. In his youth he had demanded the “ruthless criticism of everything existing.”2 Now he was mocking criticism. But his famous witticism against the young Hegelians, the phrase “critical critique,” was a dud, went up in smoke as nothing but a tautology.3 The forced primacy of praxis tionally stopped the critique that Marx himself practiced. In Russia and in the orthodoxy of other countries the malicious derision of critical tique became an instrument so that the existing conditions could lish themselves so terrifyingly. The only thing praxis still meant was: increased production of the means of production; critique was not ated anymore except for the criticism that people were not yet working hard enough. So easily does the subordination of theory to praxis invert into service rendered to renewed oppression. The repressive intolerance to the thought that is not immediately accompanied by instructions for action is founded on anxiety. meled thought and the posture that will not let it be bargained away Resignation 291 must be feared because of what one deeply knows but cannot openly admit: that the thought is right. An age-old bourgeois mechanism with which the eighteenth century enlightenment thinkers were quite iar operates once again, but unchanged: the suffering caused by a tive situation-this time by obstructed reality-becomes rage leveled at the person who expresses it. Thought, enlightenment conscious of itself, threatens to disenchant the pseudo-reality within which actionism moves, in the words of Habermas.4 The actionism is tolerated only because it is considered pseudo-reality. Pseudo-reality is conjoined with, as its subjective attitude, pseudo-activity: action that overdoes and vates itself for the sake of its own publicity*, without admitting to itself to what extent it serves as a substitute satisfaction, elevating itself into an end in itself. People locked in desperately want to get out. In such tions one doesn’t think anymore, or does so only under fictive premises. Within absolutized praxis only reaction is possible and therefore false. Only thinking could find an exit, and moreover a thinking whose results are not stipulated, as is so often the case in discussions in which it is already settled who should be right, discussions that therefore do not advance the cause but rather inevitably degenerate into tactics. If the doors are barricaded, then thought more than ever should not stop short. It should analyze the reasons and subsequently draw the conclusions. It is up to thought not to accept the situation as final. The situation can be changed, if at all, by undiminished insight. The leap into praxis does not cure thought of resignation as long as it is paid for with the secret edge that that really isn’t the right way to go. Pseudo-activity is generally the attempt to rescue enclaves of acy in the midst of a thoroughly mediated and rigidified society. Such attempts are rationalized by saying that the small change is one step in the long path toward the transformation of the whole. The disastrous model of pseudo-activity is the” do-it-yourself”* [Mach es seiher]: ities that do what has long been done better by the means of industrial production only in order to inspire in the unfree individuals, paralyzed in their spontaneity, the assurance that everything depends on them. The nonsense of do-it-yourself in the production of material goods, even in the carrying out of many repairs, is patently obvious. Admittedly the nonsense is not total. With the reduction of so-called services* stleistungen ], sometimes measures carried out by the private person that are superfluous considering the available technology nonetheless fulfill a quasi-rational purpose. The do-it-yourself approach in politics is not completely of the same caliber. The society that impenetrably confronts people is nonetheless these very people. The trust in the limited action of small groups recalls the spontaneity that withers beneath the encrusted

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292 CRITICAL MODELS 3 totality and without which this totality cannot become something ent. The administered world has the tendency to strangle all spontaneity, or at least to channel it into pseudo-activities. At least this does not tion as smoothly as the agents of the administered world would hope. However, spontaneity should not be absolutized, just as little as it should be split off from the objective situation or idolized the way the tered world itself is. Otherwise the axe in the house that never saves the carpenter will smash in the nearest door, and the riot squad will be at the ready.5 Even political undertakings can sink into pseudo-activities, into theater. It is no coincidence that the ideals of immediate action, even the propaganda of the act, have been resurrected after the willing integration of formerly progressive organizations that now in all countries of the earth are developing the characteristic traits of what they once opposed. Yet this does not invalidate the critique of anarchism. Its return is that of a ghost. The impatience with theory that manifests itself in its return does not advance thought beyond itself. By forgetting thought, the tience falls back below it. This is made easier for the individual by his capitulation to the tive with which he identifies himself. He is spared from recognizing his powerlessness; the few become the many in their own eyes. This act, not unwavering thought, is resignative. No transparent relationship obtains between the interests of the ego and the collective it surrenders itself to. The ego must abolish itself so that it may be blessed with the grace of being chosen by the collective. Tacitly a hardly Kantian categorical imperative has erected itself: you must sign. The sense of a new security is purchased with the sacrifice of autonomous thinking. The consolation that thinking improves in the context of collective action is deceptive: thinking, as a mere instrument of activist actions, atrophies like all instrumental reason. At this time no higher form of society is concretely visible: for that reason whatever acts as though it were in easy reach has something regressive about it. But according to Freud, whoever regresses has not reached his instinctual aim. Objectively regression is tion, even when it thinks itself the opposite and innocently propagates the pleasure principle. 6 By contrast the uncompromisingly critical thinker, who neither signs over his consciousness nor lets himself be terrorized into action, is in truth the one who does not give in. Thinking is not the intellectual duction of what already exists anyway. As long as it doesn’t break off, thinking has a secure hold on possibility. Its insatiable aspect, its aversion to being quickly and easily satisfied, refuses the foolish wisdom of nation. The utopian moment in thinking is stronger the less it-this too a form of relapse-objectifies itself into a utopia and hence sabotages its Resignation 293 realization. Open thinking points beyond itself. For its part a ment, a form of praxis, it is more akin to transformative praxis than a comportment that is compliant for the sake of praxis. Prior to all lar content, thinking is actually the force of resistance, from which it has been alienated only with great effort. Such an emphatic concept of ing admittedly is not secured, not by the existing conditions, nor by ends yet to be achieved, nor by any kind of battalions. Whatever has once been thought can be suppressed, forgotten, can vanish. But it cannot be denied that something of it survives. For thinking has the element of the sal. What once was thought cogently must be thought elsewhere, by ers: this confidence accompanies even the most solitary and powerless thought. Whoever thinks is not enraged in all his critique: thinking has sublimated the rage. Because the thinking person does not need to inflict rage upon himself, he does not wish to inflict it on others. The happiness that dawns in the eye of the thinking person is the happiness of ity. The universal tendency of oppression is opposed to thought as such. Thought is happiness, even where it defines unhappiness: by enunciating it. By this alone happiness reaches into the universal unhappiness. ever does not let it atrophy has not resigned. .

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)82 TRANSLATOR’S NOTES Rudi Dutschke and against the conservative publishing conglomerate Springer lag in 1968. NPD = Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany), the collective party of the extreme right, including ex-Nazi and cist groups. It developed a strong following, gaining representation in seven Lander of the Federal Republic from 1966 to 1968. 18. Allusion to the recent publication by his colleague at the Institute for Social Research; Jiirgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zur einer Kategorie der biirgerlichen Gesellschaft (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1962). lish: The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, trans. T. Burger bridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988). 19. Cf. “Betrachtungen zum 20. Juli,” in Jiirgen von Kempski, Recht und Politik: Studien zur Einheit der Sozialwissenschaft, Schriften 2, ed. Achim Eschbach furt: Suhrkamp, 1992), 321-333. Originally published in Merkur (1949). Von ski argues that the attempted coup d’etat of 20 July 1944 by Wehrmacht officers was foiled because Hitler had created diverse command structures, i.e., a bureaucracy. The final section of the article speculates about possible lessons for democratic states: It is worth considering whether splitting up the command structures as a nique for safeguarding a totalitarian regime from coups d’etat can also mutatis mutandis be translated onto democracies. As far as the safeguarding of a democratic state from overthrow is concerned, the constitutional thinkers still operate under the idea that the threat of overthrow comes from below, from the “masses.” However, under modern technological conditions, tions” can scarcely still be carried out successfully; the superiority of the state in weapons technology is too great. Moreover, for the industrial states the classical age of the revolutionary situation is long past. What threatens is the transition to totalitarian forms of government by completely or half ‘legal’ paths, the cold revolution from above. This threat demands different means than those used against revolutions from below. (332) 20. Freud, Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse (1921); English: Group ogy and the Analysis of the Ego, vol. 18 of The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1975). 21. Max Weber advocated “value-free” judgments in sociology on the model of scientific objectivity, polemicizing, on the one hand, against utilitarians who fied value with use and, on the other hand, against the unscientific particularism of the older generation of sociologists belonging to the so-called “Historical School” (e.g., Gustav Schmoller, Adolph Wagner, Georg Friedrich Knapp). Weber presents his arguments in two articles: “Die ‘Objektivitat’ sozialwissenschaftlicher and sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis,” in Archiv fiir Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 19 (1904): 22-87; “Der Sinn der ‘Wertfreiheit’ der soziologischen und okonomischen Wissenschaften,” in Logos 7 (1917-18): 4Q-88 (both reprinted in Gesammelte siitze zur Wissenschaftslehre [Tiibingen: 1968], 146-214 and 489-590). In English cf. Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. and ed. Edward Shils and H. A. Finch (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949). Adorno’s comments here echo his argu-TRANSLATOR’S NOTES )83 ments in the dispute concerning positivism in sociology. Cf. Theodor W. Adorno et al., Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie (Neuwied, Berlin: hand, 1969). Adorno’s contributions are reprinted in GS 8; English: Theodor W. Adorno et al., The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London: Heinemann, 1976). 22. A salvo in Adorno’s ongoing critique of Max Scheler’s Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik: Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines chen Personalismus (1916), reprinted in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2 (Bern/Munich: Francke Verlag, 1966). English: Formalism in Ethics and mal Ethics of Value: A New Attempt Toward the Foundation of an Ethical ism, trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern versity Press, 1973). 23. The terms “casing” [Gehiiuse], “solidification, hardening” [Verfestigung] and “autonomization of the apparatus” [Verselbstiindigung der Apparatur] derive from Weber-inspired sociological theory of bureaucratization. “Stahlhartes Gehiiuse,” an expression made famous by Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of ism, is translated in English as the “iron cage”[sic] of modernity. 24. Reference to the attempted coup d’etat of 20 July 1944 by Wehrmacht officers, most notably Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg. The attempt on Hitler’s life failed, and the conspirators were executed. 25. Allusion to the famous opening of Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852): “Hegel remarks somewhere that all great, world-historical facts and personages occur, as it were, twice. He has forgotten to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.” 26. See note 12 above. 27. Cf. the first joint publication by Marx and Engels, a satirical polemic against Bruno Bauer and the Young Hegelians: Die Heilige Familie; oder, Kritik der chen Kritik (1845). English: The Holy Family: A Critique of Critical Criticism, in The Collected Works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, ed. Y. Dakhina and T. Chikileva, val. 4 (New York: International Publishers, 1975). Critique 1. Adorno here draws on the definition of “political maturity” [Miindigkeit] from Kant’s essay “What is Enlightenment?” (1784) and draws implications from the formulation itself: miindig, liter125 KB – 13 Pages